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Abstracts: 
The objective of this study is to investigate how growth variables affect the degrees of conservatism. This study 
extends Hwang and Kim (2012) by incorporating various growth variables in explaining the degrees of 
conservatism of geographic segmental earnings. This study posits that when the multinational firms’ growth 
declines the negative economic shocks to the companies are incorporated into geographic segmental earnings 
differently. I employ the various growth variables at the firm-level versus segment-level and test how the impact 
of growth variables differentiates between the degrees of conservatism of geographic segmental earnings. 
Overall I find that firms with experiencing the declining growths are likely to incorporate those negative 
economic shocks into geographic segmental earnings differently. More importantly, the empirical findings 
suggest that the impacts of negative growth variables on geographic segmental earnings are more pronounced in 
domestic earnings than foreign earnings.   
Keyword: Geographic segment, Segmental reporting, Conditional conservatism, Growth.  
 
1. Introduction 
Basu (2005) suggests the two types of accounting conservatism: conditional conservatism and unconditional 
conservatism. Unconditional conservatism is news-independent conservatism, or ex ante conservatism in the 
sense that it recognizes losses without any additional information, only resulting that net asset understatement is 
generated. More importantly, Basu (1997, 2005) highlights the importance of conditional conservatism, which is 
news-dependent conservatism, also regarded as ex post conservatism. The concept of conditional conservatism 
is defined as differential verification requirement. Higher degrees of verification are required to recognize good 
news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses (Basu 1997, 2005; Watts 2003a). Related to the roles of 
conditional conservatism, it plays important roles in the contracting and monitoring functions of corporate 
governance (Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Lara et al. 2009). Conservatism mitigates agency costs associated with 
managerial investment decisions through preventing managers from choosing negative NPV (net present value) 
investment projects and thus preventing managers’ opportunistic behavior (Watts 2003a; Ball and Shivakumar 
2005). Conservatism also increases debt contract efficiency. It triggers debt covenant violations more quickly, 
and then transfers decision rights from managers to debtholders, which provides benefits to both creditors by 
timely signaling default risk and borrowers by ex ante lowering interest rates (e.g., Watts 2003a; Qiang 2007; 
Zhang 2008; Beatty et al. 2008). Furthermore, it plays an information role between managers and equity 
investors, especially where the information asymmetry is severe (LaFond and Watts 2008). Conservatism, 
defined as timelier recognition of losses than gains, can provide a crucial loss information of firms in the 
environment where information quality is poor. Thus, accounting conservatism that plays these various roles in 
the capital market has been rigorously investigated in accounting research.         
Hwang and Kim (2012) present that domestic earnings are more conservative than foreign earnings using 
various conservatism models employed in prior studies (e.g., Basu 1997; Ball and Shivakumar 2006; 
Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). They suggest that the incremental speed of negative return news incorporated 
into earnings relative to positive return news are significantly more pronounced in domestic operations than in 
foreign ones. Furthermore, they suggest that the two factors are likely to explain the differential conservatism; 
tax costs and financial leverage. The objective of this study is to extend Hwang and Kim (2012) by investigating 
how growth variables affect the levels of conservatism of geographic segment earnings. They argue that when 
there are negative economic shocks to the companies at the time of declining growth, accounting income is 
likely to incorporate those economic losses into their domestic earnings in a more timely fashion. Consistent 
with Hwang and Kim (2012), this study investigates various growth factors which might affect the degree of 
conservatism, and then try to explain the differential levels of conservatism of geographic segmental earnings 
from the supply side of conservatism.  
I take into account various growth variables to test the effect on the levels of conservatism between geographic 
segmental earnings. I employ change in number of employees, total sales growth and total asset growth at the 
firm-level and segmental asset turnover, segmental asset growth and segmental sales growth, return on 
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segmental asset and segmental profit margin at the segment-level. Overall I find that the degrees of various 
growth variables are negatively associated with the levels of conditional conservatism. More specifically I find 
that the declining growth is more likely to increase the level of conservatism in domestic earnings than foreign 
ones. We conclude that firms with experiencing the negative growth variables are more likely to incorporate 
those negative economic shocks into domestic earnings than into foreign earnings.  
Consequently, I find that the declining growth variables primarily increase the level of conservatism in domestic 
earnings. This study contributes to extant literature by introducing growth variables as a factor affecting the 
level of conservatism and showing that growth variables are more incorporated in domestic than foreign 
earnings.     
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Section II develops the hypothesis development; Section 
III describes the data source, variable measurements, and empirical models used to test my hypotheses; Section 
IV presents the empirical results with a discussion of their implications and Section V concludes the paper.  
 
2. Hypothesis development 
To take a step further into analyzing the accounting effects of negative economic shocks to the company, I 
employ various growth variables at the firm-level as well as at the segment-level. When sales amounts are 
decreasing or companies are downsizing through reduction in employees or disposal of assets, accounting 
income is likely to incorporate those economic losses in a timely manner. Thus, I examine how the levels of 
conditional conservatism in domestic and foreign earnings vary with the deteriorating growth variables at the 
firm-level or segment-level. 
As Hwang and Kim (2012) explain that the operating leverage at the segment-level likely explains the 
differential level of conservatism between domestic and foreign earnings, the lower operating leverage in 
foreign sites is more likely to provide less probability of recognizing economic losses such as asset write-offs or 
impairments in foreign earning, thereby generating the lower levels of conservatism in foreign earnings. Thus, I 
predict that domestic earnings primarily incorporate the declining growth factors rather than foreign earnings, 
thereby leading to higher levels of conservatism in domestic earnings than in foreign earnings.  
On the other hand, investors are more likely to demand higher conservatism in foreign operations. It is probable 
that foreign operations are more likely to face increased information asymmetry or uncertainty, especially when 
companies face some negative economic circumstances. Thus, investors are more likely to demand higher 
conservatism by anticipating the information role of conservatism in foreign operations.  
H: The levels of growth variables do not affect the levels of conservatism of geographic segmental earnings. 
 
3. Sample and Research Design 
The data covers all firms with domestic and foreign earnings and stock return data disclosed during the period 
between 1984 and 2005.  The accounting data is taken from the Compustat Annual Industrial and Compustat 
Segment File and stock return data is taken from the CRSP files. I restrict firms to the ones which are domiciled 
only in the United States. I also exclude financial firms and the 1% of extreme observations in each tail of each 
variable for each year. 
Consistent with Hwang and Kim (2012), I construct a dataset by stacking the two regressions for each domestic 
earnings and foreign earnings. Thus, I derive the following regression equation.  
DEPS
 t or FEPS t = β0 + β1D_DRETt + β2D_RETt + β3D_DRETt*RETt + 
                γ0 + γ1F_DRETt + γ2F_RETt + γ3F_DRETt*RETt + εt   … (3)  
 
DEPS  = the domestic pretax income (data#272) divided by number of 
shares (data#25) for firm i in fiscal year t, deflated by the market 
price per share (data#199) at the beginning of year t; 
FEPS = the foreign pretax income (data#273) divided by number of 
shares (data#25) for firm i in fiscal year t, deflated by the market 
price per share (data#199) at the beginning of year t; 
RET = the stock return on firm i from 9 months before fiscal year-end 
to the three months after fiscal year-end t (RET) or the stock 
return from 9 months before fiscal year-end to the three months 
after fiscal year-end t, less the corresponding CRSP equal 
weighted market return (ABRET); 
DRET = a zero/one indicator variable if set equal to 1 if RET is less than 
0; 
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The coefficients β3 and γ3 capture the incremental timeliness of bad news relative to good news in domestic and 
foreign earnings, respectively. I take into account various growth factors affecting conservatism to investigate 
how declining growth factors are incorporated into domestic and foreign earnings in the form of conservatism. I 
construct various subsamples according to the levels or signs of growth variables, run the regression analyses 
using equation (1), and then test the difference in the two coefficients, β3 and γ3. I employ change in number of 
employees, total sales growth and total asset growth at the firm-level, and segmental asset turnover, segmental 
asset growth, segmental sales growth, ROA (return on segmental asset) and segmental profit margin at the 
segment-level.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for variables employed in Basu’s conservatism models explained in 
Section III. All statistics are consistent with Hwang and Kim (2012). Mean domestic EPS is less than mean 
foreign EPS but median domestic EPS is greater than median foreign EPS, suggesting that domestic EPS is 
negatively skewed. As expected, the standard deviation (volatility) of domestic EPS is much greater than that of 
foreign EPS.  
Next, I examine whether firms’ growth variables affect the level of conditional conservatism between domestic 
and foreign earnings. I take into account various growth variables at the firm-level including the number of 
employees, total sales and asset growths using RET (Panel A of Table 2) and ABRET (Panel B of Table 2).  
Table 2 shows that as the growth is declining from High to Low the level of conservatism is increasing in both 
domestic and foreign earnings. More specifically, the conservatism of domestic earnings is increasing much 
higher than that of foreign earnings, as the growth variables are decreasing. The result is consistent with the two 
economic loss proxies of RET and ABRET and also consistent with the subsample compositions of Low, Med 
and High as well as the compositions of Negative and Non-negative. This indicates that domestic earnings 
reflect the growth properties more than foreign earnings do, implying that firm-level growth properties are more 
associated with domestic than foreign earnings. All of the firm-level growth variables including increases in 
number of employees, sales growth and total asset growth show the consistent results and the difference in the 
levels of conservatism between low growth and high growth is significant.  
Table 3 shows the results of segment-level growth including asset turnover, asset growth and sales growth. 
Asset turnover is estimated by domestic (foreign) sales divided by domestic (foreign) assets. Asset growth is 
computed by the log difference between year t-1 and year t in each segmental asset, domestic and foreign assets, 
and also sales growth is computed by the log difference between year t-1 and year t in each segment sales, 
including both domestic and foreign sales. This presents the level of conservatism of domestic and foreign 
earnings when using two economic loss proxies of RET (Panel A of Table 3) and ABRET (Panel B of Table 3) 
in the subsamples constructed based on the levels of each growth variable.  
As shown in Hwang and Kim (2012), the foreign growth variables are on average larger than domestic growth 
variables. I construct the two subsample groups based on two standards. The sample is first divided into two 
subsamples: one where the domestic growth variable is larger than the foreign growth variable and the other 
where foreign growth variable is larger than domestic growth variable. Based on the level of the difference 
between domestic and foreign growth variables, another subsample group is constructed into three subgroups: 
low, med and high. I conjecture that higher levels of conservatism in domestic earnings are due to the lower 
growth in domestic than foreign operation. Thus, this test is to examine whether the lower growth in domestic 
operation are associated with the higher levels of conservatism of domestic earnings.  
The results of Table 3 are based on the Fama-Macbeth (1973) regression. Consistent with previous results, it 
shows that the levels of conservatism of domestic earnings are significantly higher than that of foreign earnings. 
More importantly, related to the test of the association between segment-level growth and conservatism, I 
predict that the conservatism of domestic earnings is more pronounced when domestic operations are declining 
faster than foreign operations, thus increasing the difference in the level of conservatism between both 
operations. First, regarding asset growth, when domestic asset growth is less than foreign asset growth 
(F_ATGROW > D_ATGROW) and the difference in asset growth between both operations (F_ATGROW minus 
D_ATGROW) is High, the levels of conservatism of domestic earnings are significantly higher, 0.351 
(F_ATGROW > D_ATGROW) vs. 0.223 (D_ATGROW > F_ATGROW) and 0.360 (High) vs. 0.232 (Low) in 
F_ATGROW minus D_ATGROW, thereby increasing the difference in conservatism between both earnings.  
Second, related to segment Sales growth, the results are consistent but not as significant as asset growth. The 
results show that the coefficients of the subsample of F_SGROW > D_SGROW (F_SGROW is greater than 
D_SGROW) are larger than the coefficients in the subsample of D_SGROW > F_SGROW (D_SGROW is greater 
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than F_SGROW) but the difference between the subsamples is not significant. In addition, regarding the 
subsamples of F_SGROW minus D_SGROW, I expect the coefficients to show an increasing pattern across Low, 
Med and High subsamples, but the results do not.  
The last variable of segment-level growth is Asset turnover, which shows segment-level operating efficiency 
and represents operating leverage. Higher asset turnover is likely to represent lower operating leverage. The 
subsamples constructed using asset turnover show similar results consistent with our prediction. Specifically, 
the coefficient (0.317) of subsample of F_ATURN > D_ATURN is greater than the coefficient (0.276) of the 
subsample of F_ATURN < D_ATURN. Consistently, the subsample of High of F_ATURN minus D_ATURN has 
a higher coefficient (0.303) than the subsample of Low of F_ATURN minus D_ATURN (0.269). Thus, these 
results suggest that the asset turnover affects the level of conservatism of domestic earnings significantly, hence, 
increasing the difference of conservatism between domestic and foreign earnings.  
Notably, the results of asset turnover likely support the argument of the operating leverage theory for explaining 
the differential conservatism between domestic and foreign earnings. This is because lower asset turnover of 
domestic operations, which is considered higher operating leverage, are more likely to be associated with higher 
conservatism in domestic earnings, thus increasing the gap between both earnings.      
Furthermore, I consider additional segment-level growth variables, ROA (=each segment pretax income divided 
by each segment assets) and Profit Margin (=each segment pretax income divided by segment sales). Table 4 
represents Basu’s coefficients of domestic and foreign earnings by subsamples constructed based on ROA and 
Profit Margin in using the two economic loss proxies, RET (Panel A of Table 4) and ABRET (Panel B of Table 
4). I predict that the differential conservatism between domestic and foreign earnings is more pronounced when 
domestic ROA is less than foreign ROA. This is because domestic operations incorporate more negative 
economic news into the earnings, especially lower ROA in domestic operations, thus generating higher 
conservatism in domestic earnings, which leads to a significant differential conservatism between both earnings. 
As predicted, the empirical results show that domestic Basu coefficients, of the subsample where domestic ROA 
is less than foreign ROA (F_ROA > D_ROA), are significantly larger than those of subsample where domestic 
ROA is larger than foreign ROA (D_ROA > F_ROA). Also, the three subsamples constructed by the level of 
difference between foreign ROA and domestic ROA (F_ROA minus D_ROA) show an increasing pattern over 
Low, Med and High groups. In other words, as the foreign ROA is increasing relative to domestic ROA, the 
level of conditional conservatism in domestic earnings is monotonically increasing, implying that domestic 
earnings reflect more negative shocks such as lower ROA. Also, the results of ROA are likely to be consistent 
with the operating leverage theory in that higher ROA is associated with higher asset turnover and higher asset 
turnover is likely to be associated with lower operating leverage.   
Moving on the second measure, the segment-level Profit Margin (or return on sales) is computed by the 
segment pretax income divided by segment sales. Similar to the previous prediction, I predict that when foreign 
profit margin is larger than domestic profit margin (F_ROS > D_ROS) or the amount of foreign profit margin 
minus domestic profit margin (F_ROS minus D_ROS) is increasing, the conservatism in domestic earnings is 
higher than in the opposite cases. As predicted, I find that the regression results are significantly consistent, 
showing that domestic operations primarily incorporate the bad news into their earnings, thus leading to much 
higher conservatism in domestic earnings. Foreign operations, however, do not. Specifically in the case of 
domestic earnings, the subsample High of F_ROS minus D_ROS has coefficients of 0.368 (t=6.65) and 0.312 
(t=7.08) in RET and ABRET, respectively and the subsample F_ROS > D_ROS has coefficients of 0.367 
(t=8.85) and 0.300(t=9.09) in RET and ABRET, respectively. As predicted, the subsamples of Low of F_ROS 
minus D_ROS and F_ROS > D_ROS have 0.124 (t=4.85) and 0.120 (t=5.08) in RET and 0.091 (t=4.55) and 
0.096 (t=5.67) in ABRET, respectively. These results that negative economic shocks are primarily hitting 
domestic operations increase the differential conservatism between both earnings.  
Lastly, Table 5 breaks the sample down four subsamples by using the sign of each growth variable in domestic 
and foreign operations. I expect that the incremental conservatism of domestic over foreign earnings would be 
highest when the domestic growths are negative and foreign growths are positive. I take into account three 
segment-level growth variables including sales growth, asset growth and asset turnover. Related to assets 
growth, the empirical results show that the levels of conservatism of domestic and foreign earnings are highest 
when each growth is negative, but it shows that domestic growth significantly increases the degree of domestic 
conservatism more, thus suggesting that negative domestic growth dominates the differential level of 
conservatism between both earnings. Then, related to sales growth, consistent with asset growth, the degree of 
conservatism is highest when domestic growth is negative. Especially when both growths are negative the 
degree of domestic conservatism is highest and thus the differential level of conservatism is highest. Lastly, 
related to asset turnover, the empirical results are not consistent with the previous growth variables. This is 
because asset turnover represents operating efficiency as well as operating leverage. The conservatism of 
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domestic earnings is much higher even when both signs of both growth variables are positive. From the 
empirical results of Table 5, I conclude that the growth of domestic operations has a more significant impact on 
the level of conservatism in domestic earnings than that of foreign operations does, thus explaining the 
differential level of conservatism.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this study I explore the growth factors affecting conditional conservatism and investigate how various growth 
factors explain the levels of conservatism between domestic and foreign earnings. Specifically, I show the 
effects of the growth factors on the levels of conservatism and provide the explanations of the effects according 
to the two theories: operating leverage theory from the supply side of conservatism and information asymmetry 
theory from the demand side of conservatism. 
To explain the empirical results of differential conservatism evidenced by Hwang and Kim (2012), I search for 
and test the possible factors that could affect the degree of differential conservatism, including various growth 
variables at the segment-level versus at the firm-level. Overall I find that firms’ negative economic shocks are 
more incorporated in domestic earnings than foreign earnings, thus increasing the difference in the degrees of 
conservatism between both earnings; and as the growth of firms declines the higher the degree of conservatism 
of domestic earnings becomes.  
This study builds on accounting literature by providing additional evidence that growth is likely to be a factor 
for conditional conservatism, and that firms are more likely to supply conservative accounting due to firms’ 
characteristics or circumstances even if investors require somewhat different levels of conservatism. Likewise, 
this study contributes to the literature of geographic segmental earnings by suggesting that negative economic 
shocks to the firms affect the geographic segmental financial reporting.  
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for Basu’s Conservatism Model  
 
Variable Mean STD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
DEPS t 0.008 0.196 -7.127 -0.013 0.040  0.088 0.534 
FEPS t 0.021 0.054 -0.656 0.000  0.012 0.036 0.619 
RET t 0.133 0.546 -0.958 -0.191 0.065 0.346 7.987 
ABRET t -0.019 0.501 -1.282 -0.317 -0.069 0.191 7.442 
DEPS (FEPS) represents the domestic (foreign) pretax income (data#272 or data#273) divided by number of 
shares (data#25) for firm i in fiscal year t, deflated by the stock price (data#199) at the beginning of fiscal year 
t; RET represents the stock return on firm i from 9 months before fiscal year-end to the three months after fiscal 
year-end t; ABRET represents the stock return from 9 months before fiscal year-end to the three months after 
fiscal year-end t, less the corresponding CRSP equal weighted market return; 
 
 
Table 2 Conditional conservatism by Firm-level Growth 
Panel A. Regression by Growth at the firm level- Return 
Variable 
    RET      
  Mean Median 
Domestic 
β3 
 
Foreign 
γ3 
Adj.R2  N  
Growth in Low -0.176 -0.099 0.390  0.050  0.144  15,801   
Employees     (8.77***) (7.25***)  Domestic   
  Med 0.023 0.021 0.253  0.026  0.237 Low-
High 
15,802   
      (10.42***) (3.87***)  0.248   
  High 0.274 0.182 0.142  0.018  0.185 (5.29***) 15,803   
      (7.11***) (3.62***)     
  Negative -0.150 -0.078 0.394  0.050  0.144  18,872   
      (9.36***) (8.09***)     
  Non 0.166 0.091 0.188  0.025  0.200  28,534   
  -
negative 
  (11.41***) (6.42***)     
Sales growth Low -0.144 -0.066 0.407  0.057  0.137  16,008   
     (7.94***) (8.09***)  Domestic   
  Med 0.077 0.077 0.231  0.011  0.251 Low-
High 
16,010   
      (8.64***) (1.62)  0.224   
  High 0.331 0.245 0.183  0.033  0.209 (5.03***) 16,009   
      (9.08***) (5.03***)     
  Negative -0.174 -0.094 0.416  0.055  0.150  13,377   
      (7.48***) (6.94***)     
  Non 0.190 0.125 0.197  0.025  0.217  34,650   
  -
negative 
  (10.75***) (5.54***)     
Total asset Low -0.128  -0.069  0.398 0.052 0.167  14,410  
growth       (7.26***) (6.26***)  Domestic   
 Med 0.060  0.059  0.148 0.018 0.281 Low-
High 
14,410  
        (8.65***) (1.50)  0.285   
  High 0.310  0.223  0.113 0.031 0.280 (5.49***) 14,410  
        (5.73***) (4.88***)     
 Negative -0.136  -0.076  0.398 0.052 0.172  13,588  
       (7.19***) (6.44***)     
 Non 0.180  0.114  0.147 0.025 0.272  29,642  
 
-
negative 
  (7.53***) (4.26***)     
1. This table prese ts the results of the Fama-MacBeth regression using Basu (1997)’s model. The numbers are 
the estimated coefficients, β3and γ3, on DRET*RET terms for domestic and foreign earnings, respectively.  
 
DEPS
 t or FEPS t = 
β0 + β1D_DRETt + β2D_RETt + β3D_DRETt*RETt + γ0 + γ1F_DRETt + γ2F_RETt + γ3F_DRETt*RETt + εt   
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The regression is performed on the subsamples based on the levels of firm-level growth measures including 
growth in employees, sales growth and total asset growth. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.  
 
2. Variable definition:  
Growth in employees = log difference in the number of employees (data#29) from year t-1 to year t; Sales 
growth = log difference in the total net sales from year t-1 to year t; Total asset growth = log difference in the 
total assets from year t-1 to year t; RET = Return on firm i from 9 months before fiscal year-end to the three 
months after fiscal year-end t. ABRET = the stock return from 9 months before fiscal year-end to the three 
months after fiscal year-end t, less the corresponding CRSP equal weighted market return.   
 
Panel B. Regression by Growth at the firm level - Abnormal return 
Variable 
     ABRET     
  
Mean Median 
 Domestic 
β3 
Foreign 
γ3 
Adj.R2 
 
N 
Growth in Low -0.176 -0.099  0.328  0.033  0.140  15,801  
Employees      (10.79***) (5.89***)  Domestic  
  Med 0.023 0.021  0.215  0.021  0.235 Low-
High 
15,802  
       (9.90***) (3.29***)  0.191  
  High 0.274 0.182  0.137  0.016  0.185 (2.28**) 15,803  
       (6.88***) (4.10***)    
  Negative -0.150 -0.078  0.331  0.034  0.141  18,872  
       (11.10***) (6.53***)    
  Non 0.166 0.091  0.167  0.020  0.200  28,534  
  -
negative 
  
 (10.67***) (7.19***)    
Sales growth Low -0.144 -0.066  0.331  0.039  0.133  16,008  
      (9.44***) (5.96***)  Domestic  
  Med 0.077 0.077  0.203  0.009  0.250 Low-
High 
16,010  
       (9.96***) (1.71)  0.178  
  High 0.331 0.245  0.153  0.028  0.209 (2.16**) 16,009  
       (10.31***) (5.42***)    
  Negative -0.174 -0.094  0.337  0.039  0.147  13,377  
       (8.77***) (5.78***)    
  Non 0.190 0.125  0.175  0.021  0.217  34,650  
  -
negative 
  
 (12.07***) (5.45***)    
Total asset Low -0.128  -0.069   0.328 0.033 0.161  14,410 
growth        (9.54***) (4.77***)  Domestic  
 Med 0.060  0.059   0.143 0.012 0.280 Low-
High 
14,410 
         (11.16***) (2.76**)  0.149  
  High 0.310  0.223   0.179 -0.004 0.291 (1.70*) 14,410 
         (2.62**) (-0.16)    
 Negative -0.136  -0.076   0.326 0.033 0.166  13,588 
        (9.66***) (4.61***)    
 Non 0.180  0.114   0.221 0.005 0.282  29,642 
 
-
negative 
   (2.41**) (0.40)    
1. This table prese ts the results of the Fama-MacBeth regression using Basu (1997)’s model. The numbers are 
the estimated coefficients on DRET*RET terms (β3and γ3) for domestic and foreign earnings,  
 
DEPS
 t or FEPS t = β0 + β1D_DRETt + β2D_RETt + β3D_DRETt*RETt +  
γ0 + γ1F_DRETt + γ2F_RETt + γ3F_DRETt*RETt + εt   
 
The regression is performed on the subsamples based on the levels of firm-level growth measures including 
growth in employees, sales growth and total asset growth. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 
2. Variable definition: See Panel A of Table 2. 
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Table 3  Conditional conservatism by Growth at the Segment-level  
 
Panel A. Regression by segment-level growth: Return (RET) 
Growth     RET    
 Variables 
   Mean Med. 
Domestic 
β3 
Foreign 
γ3 Adj.R2 
 
Asset Growth D_ATGROW D_ 0.186 0.120 0.223 0.086 0.148  
  
> F_ATGROW 
ATGROW 
F_ 
ATGROW 
-0.097 -0.027 (5.34***) (4.04***)   
 F_ATGROW D_ 
ATGROW 
-0.006 0.016 0.351 0.045 0.155  
   > D_ATGROW F_ 
ATGROW 
0.282 0.184 (7.72***) (5.11***)   
 F_ATGROW Low -0.353 -0.205 0.232 0.087 0.145  
 minus     (4.76***) (3.87***)   
 D_ATGROW Med. 0.043 0.042 0.259 0.045 0.199  
     (6.02***) (5.03***)   
  High 0.447 0.304 0.360 0.062 0.135  
       (7.14***) (3.51***)   
Sales Growth D_SGROW D-SGROW 0.157 0.109 0.306 0.042 0.142  
 > F_SGROW F- SGROW -0.100 0.000 (7.49***) (3.97***)   
 F_SGROW D- SGROW -0.004 0.028 0.311 0.047 0.149  
  > D_SGROW F- SGROW 0.275 0.178 (7.73***) (7.58***)   
 F_SGROW Low -0.300 -0.152 0.288 0.047 0.129  
 minus     (6.98***) (4.23***)   
 D_SGROW Med. 0.051 0.050 0.341 0.034 0.187  
     (9.52***) (2.92**)   
  High 0.456 0.288 0.293 0.047 0.132  
       (6.02***) (6.92***)   
        
 
Asset  D_ATURN D_ATURN 1.665 1.505 0.276 0.046 0.161  
Turnover  > F_ATURN F_ATURN 1.107 1.078 (9.59***) (4.08***)   
 F_ATURN D_ATURN 1.070 1.012 0.317 0.057 0.155  
    > D_ATURN F_ATURN 1.912 1.576 (5.93***) (6.80***)   
 F_ATURN Low -0.717 -0.485 0.269 0.052 0.153  
 minus     (7.37***) (4.10***)   
 D_ATURN Med. 0.084 0.078 0.324 0.062 0.184  
 
 
   (5.84***) (5.94***)   
  High 1.301 0.783 0.303 0.049 0.139  
        (5.86***) (4.71***)   
1. This table presents the results of the Fama-MacBeth regression using Basu (1997)’s model. The numbers are 
the estimated coefficients on DRET*RET terms (β3 and γ3) for domestic and foreign earnings,  
 
DEPS
 t or FEPS t = β0 + β1D_DRETt + β2D_RETt + β3D_DRETt*RETt  
+ γ0 + γ1F_DRETt + γ2F_RETt + γ3F_DRETt*RETt + εt   
 
The regression is performed on the subsamples based on the levels of segment-level growth measures including 
asset turnover, asset growth and sales growth. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% 
level, **significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 
2. Variable definition: Asset growth (D_ATGROW or D_ATGROW) is computed by taking the log difference in 
domestic (or foreign) assets between year t and year t-1, available in Compustat Segment File; Sales growth 
(D_SGROW or F_SGROW) is computed by taking the log difference in domestic (or foreign) sales between year 
t and year t-1, available from in Compustat Segment File; Asset turnover ( D_ATURN or F_ATURN) is 
computed domestic (or foreign) sales divided by average domestic (or foreign) assets, segment sales and asset 
data are available in Compustat Segment Files; RET = Return on firm i from 9 months before fiscal year-end to 
the three months after fiscal year-end t. ABRET = the stock return from 9 months before fiscal year-end to the 
three months after fiscal year-end t, less the corresponding CRSP equal weighted market return. 
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Panel B. Regression by Segment-level growth: Abnormal Return (ABRET) 
Growth    ABRET    
 Variables 
   
 Domestic 
β3 
Foreign 
γ3 Adj.R2 N 
Asset Growth D_ATGROW   0.212 0.053 0.135 9,573 
  
> F_ATGROW 
ATGROW 
 
 (6.82***) (6.73***)   
 F_ATGROW   0.283 0.028 0.152 12,978 
   > D_ATGROW   (9.60***) (3.57***)    
 F_ATGROW Low  0.205 0.051 0.133 7,516 
 minus    (5.31***) (5.57***)   
 D_ATGROW Med.  0.232 0.033 0.194 7,518 
   
 (6.82***) (4.07***)   
  High  0.295 0.028 0.133 7,517 
      (8.87***) (2.98***)    
Sales Growth D_SGROW   0.242 0.029 0.137 13,723 
 > F_SGROW   (8.05***) (8.16***)   
 F_SGROW   0.255 0.028 0.143 21,279 
  > D_SGROW   (9.20***) (5.55***)    
 F_SGROW Low  0.234 0.030 0.123 11,666 
 minus    (7.58***) (6.59***)   
 D_SGROW Med.  0.261 0.017 0.182 11,668 
   
 (7.91***) (2.03**)   
  High  0.249 0.030 0.127 11,668 
      (8.28***) (5.52***)    
   
 
    
Asset  D_ATURN   0.240 0.038 0.158 9,963 
Turnover  > F_ATURN   (9.46***) (3.21***)   
 F_ATURN   0.257 0.040 0.148 12,571 
    > D_ATURN   (9.45***) (7.19***)    
 F_ATURN Low  0.224 0.034 0.148 7,510 
 minus    (8.00***) (2.85***)   
 D_ATURN Med.  0.256 0.051 0.171 7,512 
 
 
 
 (7.46***) (5.67***)   
  High  0.260 0.034 0.134 7,512 
      (9.45***) (5.80***)    
1. This table presents the results of the Fama-MacBeth regression using Basu (1997)’s model. The numbers are 
the estimated coefficients on DRET*RET terms (β3 and γ3) for domestic and foreign earnings,  
 
DEPS
 t or FEPS t =  
β0 + β1D_DRETt + β2D_RETt + β3D_DRETt*RETt + γ0 + γ1F_DRETt + γ2F_RETt + γ3F_DRETt*RETt + εt   
 
The regression is performed on the subsamples based on the levels of segment-level growth measures including 
asset turnover, asset growth and sales growth. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% 
level, **significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 
2. Variable definition: See Panel A of Table 3 
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Table 4  Conditional conservatism by segment-level growth II 
Panel A: Regression by Segment-level growth II: Return 
Growth     RET    
 Variables 
   Mean Med. 
Domestic 
β3 
Foreign 
γ3 Adj.R2 
 
ROA  D_ROA D- 0.139 0.129 0.165 0.082 0.380  
 > F_ ROA F- ROA 0.017 0.046 (5.30***) (7.19***)  
 F_ ROA D- 
ROA 
-0.003 0.026 0.348 0.041 0.178  
  > D_ ROA F- ROA 0.144 0.127 (10.29***) (4.20***)  
 F_ ROA Low -0.151 -0.110 0.160 0.075 0.397  
 minus     (4.95***) (5.42***)  
 D_ ROA Med. 0.024 0.023 0.242 0.055 0.280  
     (7.45***) (5.63***)  
  High 0.225 0.177 0.380 0.055 0.230  
       (8.40***) (4.60***)  
Profit Margin D_ROS D_ 0.136 0.110 0.120 0.054 0.400  
(ROS) > F_ROS F_ 
ROS 
0.008 0.034 (5.08***) (5.67***)  
 F_ROS D_ 
ROS 
-0.090 0.011 0.367 0.047 0.175  
   > D_ROS F_ 
ROS 
0.112 0.097 (8.85***) (5.82***)  
 F_ROS Low -0.161 -0.100 0.124 0.056 0.402  
 minus     (4.85***) (5.50***)  
 D_ROS Med. 0.019 0.017 0.227 0.048 0.264  
     (6.44***) (6.12***)  
  High 0.322 0.174 0.368 0.054 0.235  
       (6.65***) (5.56***)  
1. This table presents the results of the Fama-MacBeth regression using Basu (1997)’s model. The numbers are 
the estimated coefficients on DRET*RET terms (β3and γ3) for domestic and foreign earnings  
 
DEPS
 t or FEPS t = β0 + β1D_DRETt + β2D_RETt + β3D_DRETt*RETt +  
γ0 + γ1F_DRETt + γ2F_RETt + γ3F_DRETt*RETt + εt   
 
The regression is performed on the subsamples based on the levels of segment-level growth including ROA and 
Profit Margin. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% 
level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 
2. Variable definition: ROA (D_ROA or F_ROA) = domestic or foreign pretax income (data#272 or data#273) 
divided by average domestic or foreign assets (Compustat Segment Files).; ROS (D_ROS or F_ROS)= domestic 
or foreign pretax income (data#272 or data#273) divided by domestic or foreign sales (Compustat Segment 
File); D_SGROW (or F_SGROW)= log difference in domestic (or foreign) sales between year t and year t-1, 
segment sales data are available in Compustat Segment File; D_ATGROW (or F_ATGROW) = log difference in 
domestic (or foreign) assets between year t and year t-1, segment assets are available in Compustat Segment 
File; RET = Return on firm i from 9 months before fiscal year-end to the three months after fiscal year-end t. 
ABRET = the stock return from 9 months before fiscal year-end to the three months after fiscal year-end t, less 
the corresponding CRSP equal weighted market return.    
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Panel B: Regression by Segment-level growth II: Abnormal return 
Growth   ABRET    
 Variables 
   
Domestic 
β3 
Foreign 
γ3 Adj.R2 N 
ROA  D_ROA D-  0.114 0.058 0.377  9,043 
 > F_ ROA F- ROA  (5.91***) (6.75***)   
 F_ ROA D- 
ROA 
 0.281 0.033 0.172  12,264 
  > D_ ROA F- ROA  (10.96***) (4.28***)   
 F_ ROA Low  0.120 0.061 0.394  7,102 
 minus    (5.91***) (6.30***)   
 D_ ROA Med.  0.152 0.042 0.275  7,103 
   
 (5.14***) (4.89***)   
  High  0.306 0.045 0.228  7,102 
      (9.57***) (4.50***)   
Profit Margin D_ROS D_  0.096 0.042 0.399  14,680 
(ROS) > F_ROS F_ 
ROS 
 (5.67***) (5.60***)   
 F_ROS D_ 
ROS 
 0.300 0.031 0.170  19,369 
   > D_ROS F_ 
ROS 
 (9.09***) (6.82***)   
 F_ROS Low  0.091 0.042 0.400  11,349 
 minus    (4.55***) (4.68***)   
 D_ROS Med.  0.153 0.036 0.256  11,351 
   
 (7.75***) (5.40***)   
  High  0.312 0.037 0.234  11,349 
      (7.08***) (6.49***)   
1. This table presents the results of the Fama-MacBeth regression using Basu (1997)’s model. The numbers are 
the estimated coefficients on DRET*RET terms (β3and γ3) for domestic and foreign earnings  
 
DEPS
 t or FEPS t = β0 + β1D_DRETt + β2D_RETt + β3D_DRETt*RETt +  
γ0 + γ1F_DRETt + γ2F_RETt + γ3F_DRETt*RETt + εt   
 
The regression is performed on the subsamples based on the levels of segment-level growth including ROA and 
Profit Margin. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% 
level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 
2. Variable definition: See Panel A of Table 4. 
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Table 5 
 Conditional conservatism by segment-level growth III 
 
 Sign of Sign of RET      ABRET    
  Domesti
c growth 
Foreign 
growth 
Domestic 
β3 
Foreign 
γ3 
Adj.R2  Domestic 
β3 
Foreign 
γ3 
Adj.R2 N 
Assets positive negative 0.130  0.047  0.168  0.179  0.041  0.169 4,346 
growth   (2.59**)  (3.61***)    (4.71 ***) (3.79***)    
 positive positive 0.146  0.018  0.366  0.117  0.018  0.364 11,335 
   (7.21***) (2.42)    (7.87***)  (3.76***)    
  negative negative 0.346  0.040  0.130  0.283  0.025  0.129 25,637 
   (6.42***)  (6.16***)    (9.27***)  (5.01***)    
 negative positive 0.312  0.009  0.120  0.277  0.001  0.114 5,406 
      (7.62***)  (0.50)    (9.25***)  (0.06)     
Sales positive negative 0.240  0.012  0.168  0.207  0.015  0.170 10,605 
growth   (6.01***)  (1.35)    (10.03***)  (3.01***)    
 positive positive 0.162  0.028  0.265  0.155  0.022  0.264 18,913 
   (12.65***)  (3.75***)    (10.17***)  (3.56***)    
 negative negative 0.414  0.046  0.154  0.308  0.030  0.147 10,560 
   (6.78***)  (4.48***)   (7.71***)  (4.58***)    
 negative positive 0.333  0.064  0.131  0.285  0.035  0.129 6,646 
      (7.17***)  (5.14***)    (7.73***)  (2.94***)     
      
 
    
Asset positive negative 0.172  0.009  -0.043  0.075  -0.087  0.010 1,325 
turnover   (1.72)  (1.07)    (1.08)  (-0.89)    
 positive positive 0.310  0.057  0.145  0.255  0.036  0.139 22,534 
   (9.92***)  (7.74***)    (10.85***)  (7.48***)    
 negative negative 0.309  0.021  0.147  0.257  0.015  0.147 21,266 
   (7.02***) (3.67***)    (9.71***)  (3.14***)    
 negative positive 0.276  0.083  0.210  0.282  0.070  0.228 1,599 
      (2.69**)  (2.47**)    (3.14***)  (2.26**)    
1. This table presents the results of the Fama-MacBeth regression using Basu (1997)’s model. The numbers are 
the estimated coefficients on DRET*RET terms (β3and γ3) for domestic and foreign earnings  
 
DEPS
 t or FEPS t = β0 + β1D_DRETt + β2D_RETt + β3D_DRETt*RETt  
+ γ0 + γ1F_DRETt + γ2F_RETt + γ3F_DRETt*RETt + εt   
 
The regression is performed on the subsamples based on the levels of segment-level growth, more specifically depending on 
the signs of growth in domestic and foreign operations. Thus, each growth variable constructs four different subsamples. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% 
level. 
 
2. Variable definition: Asset turnover ( D_ATURN or F_ATURN) is computed domestic (or foreign) sales divided by average 
domestic (or foreign) assets; Asset growth (D_ATGROW or D_ATGROW) is computed log difference in domestic (or 
foreign) assets between year t and year t-1, available in Compustat Segment File; Sales growth (D_SGROW or F_SGROW) 
is computed by taking the log difference in domestic (or foreign) sales between year t and year t-1, available from in 
Compustat Segment File; RET = Return on firm i from 9 months before fiscal year-end to the three months after fiscal year-
end t. ABRET = the stock return from 9 months before fiscal year-end to the three months after fiscal year-end t, less the 
corresponding CRSP equal weighted market return. 
 
